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NLRA/TITLE VII
Labor Law-The Relationship of Title VII to the National Labor
Relations Act
In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organ-
ization' the United States Supreme Court was faced with the problem
of reconciling the national policy of non-discrimination in employment
as embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) 2
with the exclusive bargaining principle of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or the Act).3 The Court held that concerted activities by a
group of minority employees attempting to bargain collectively with
their employer over allegedly racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices would not be protected by the NLRA. Resolving this issue in
favor of the traditional approaches to exclusive bargaining, the Court
dealt reformers a temporary setback, but preserved the integrity of the
procedures of the Act.
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted by Congress "to
promote industrial peace and the improvement of wages and working
conditions by fostering a system of employee organization and collective
bargaining."4 The Act establishes the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) to oversee and carry out its provisions. Section 7 of
the Act 6 creates certain basic rights of employees; section 8 of the
Act7 protects these rights from interference by employers or unions."
However, other sections and policies of the Act restrict the scope of
section 7. Therefore, although certain employee conduct may conform
to the precise language of section 7, that section will afford the individu-
1. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eto e-17 (Supp. II, 1972).
3. 29 id. §§ 141-87 (1970).
4. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see NLRA §§ 1, 101, 29 U.S.C. §§
141, 151 (1970).
5. NLRA §§ 3-6, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1970).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3)
of this title.
7. Id. § 158(a).
8. Id. § 158(b).
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al no protection if his actions are repugnant to other provisions of the
Act.'
One of the recognized section 7 rights is the employee's right "to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection."' 0  In cases such as NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co." the courts have interpreted this right to be
limited by the principle of section 9(a)12 that the authorized bargaining
agent will be the exclusive representative of all employees in the bar-
gaining unit.'3 As a result, it has generally been held that section 7
does not protect employees who undertake to utilize economic pressure
independent of their bargaining representative in seeking to deal with
the employer over wages, hours or other conditions of employment.1 4
The underlying policy of Title VII is the achievement of equality in
employment through the elimination of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'5 The Equal Employment
9. An unprotected employee is subject to employer discipline, which is otherwise
proscribed by section 8 (a) (1).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides in part: "Representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.. .."
13. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216
(9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
14. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. RE'V. 1195,
1197, 1242 (1967).
The employee's right to individually order his relations with his employer are
sacrificed under the Act in order to promote the policy that the most effective bargaining
tool of employees is that of pooling their economic strength and acting through a chosen
labor organization. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180. Therefore,
"the majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor law
policy." Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility
in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
However, in order to prevent a tyranny of the majority and safeguard the interests
of the minority of bargaining unit members, the courts have imposed upon the bargaining
agent a concomitant duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit. Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Accord, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953). The duty can be enforced either by a suit for damages, see, 6.g., Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra, or by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
see, e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
15. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
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Opportunities Commission (EEOC) was created to inplement this
policy through a system of voluntary compliance.1 6 Title VII prohibits
discrimination by both employers17 and unions' s and can be seen as a
response to unfair treatment of minorities by both and a reflection of a
national policy against discriminatory employment practices.' 9 One of
the protections offered by Title VII is section 704(a)20 which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because
he has opposed practices made unlawful by the statute. Although there
has been no definitive pronouncement on the scope of the provision, 2'
the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that section 704(a) will
cover employee "participation in legitimate civil rights activities or pro-
tests.
22
The dispute before the Court in Emporium Capwell originated in
a report issued by the Department Store Employees Union (the Union)
supporting charges made by a group of employees that the Emporium
Capwell Co. (the Company or the Employer) was engaging in racially
discriminatory employment practices.2 3  The collective bargaining
agreement between the Union and the Company contained, among other
provisions, a no-discrimination clause 24 and a system of grievance and
16. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (Supp. II, 1972).
18. Id. § 2000e-2(c) (2).
19. Comment, Federal Courts as Primary Protectors of Title VII Rights, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 162, 165 (1974).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-3 (a) (Supp. 11, 1972) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrim-
inate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an em-
ployment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual; or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any man-
ner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subehapter.
21. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. at 71-72 n.25.
22. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973).
23. The main concern of the employees was the case of Russell Young, a black
passed over for promotion allegedly because of his race. On the basis of the Union's
report, Young was later promoted to the position of first assistant manager prior to the
start of the picketing. The Emporium and Western Addition Community Organization,
192 N.L.R.B. 173, 180-81 (1971) (trial examiner's decision). The trial examiner's
decision is found appended to the NLRB decision. Id. at 179-86.
24. Section 21(E) provided: "No person shall be discriminated against in regard to
hire, tenure of employment or job status by reason of race, color, creed, national origin,
age or sex." Id. at 180 (trial examiner's decision).
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arbitration procedures to handle all alleged contract violations.2" The
Union stated that it was prepared to take these allegations before the
Adjustment Board and all the way to arbitration, if necessary. 20 A
meeting of the Adjustment Board was set, and employees Tom Hawkins
and James Joseph Hollins, the subjects of this litigation, were scheduled
to testify on behalf of the Union. However, when called upon at the
proceeding, they refused to participate, 27 thus preventing resolution of
the grievance. Later, Hawkins and Hollins held a press conference and
publicly charged the Company with employment discrimination against
racial minorities. 28 Afterwards, they commenced picketing and pam-
phleting in front of the Company's store,'m and were subsequently
notified by the Company that repeated acts or statements of this nature
would result in their discharge.30 In spite of this, they resumed their
activities and, as a result, received discharge slips."'
A charge against the Company was subsequently filed with the
NLRB by the Western Addition Community Organization 32 on behalf
25. Section 5(B) provided: "Any act of any employer, representative of the Union,
or any employee that is interfering with the faithful performance of this agreement...
may be referred to the Adjustment Board for such action as the Adjustment Board deems
proper, and is permissive within this agreement." Id. (trial examiner's decision).
Sections 36(B)-(F) described the functions of the Adjustment Board and provided
for submission of a grievance to final and binding arbitration at the request of either
of the parties if the Adjustment Board cannot settle the issue. Id.
The collective bargaining agreement also contained a no-strike-no-lockout clause in
section 36(A), id., and provided that the Union would be the sole bargaining agent for
all employees. 420 U.S. at 53.
26. The feeling was expressed by sonie employees that the contract procedures were
insufficient and that something "dramatic" was needed. They urged the Union to picket
the Company. The Union responded by saying that the collective bargaining agreement
prohibited picketing and that, although the proceedings would take time, the beneficial
effects would be more widespread and longer lasting. 420 U.S. at 54.
27. At the meeting, Hawkins and Hollins read a statement objecting to processing
the grievance on an individual basis, calling for group action and demanding a meeting
with the Company's president. They then walked out. 192 N.L.R.B. at 181 (trial
examiner's decision).
28. The conference was held with the local media after an unsuccessful attempt by
Hollins to meet and negotiate with the Company's president. Id.
29. The pamphlets basically reiterated the charges made at the press conference
and called for a boycott of the Employer's store. They referred to the Company as a
"racist pig" and "a 20th century colonial plantation" and compared its operations to
those of "the slave mines of South Africa." Id.
30. In a written warning, the Company claimed that the charges made by the
employees were untrue and deliberately designed to injure its reputation. After stating
that there were ample remedies already in existence to correct any alleged discrimina-
tion, the Company warned that discharge would follow a repetition of the same conduct.
Id. at 181-82.
31. The Union did not advise the parties to picket and later urged them to follow
the Union's program through arbitration, warning them that their picketing could result
in their being fired. Id. at 182.
32. The Western Addition Community Organization is a local San Francisco civil
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of Hawkins and Hollins, alleging that their discharge violated section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. s3 After conducting a hearing, the NLRB Trial
Examiner found in favor of the Company,34 concluding that the conduct
of the employees was not protected by section 7 because it was disrup-
tive of the collective bargaining relationship existing between the Union
and the Company."; The NLRB, on review, adopted and affirmed the
findings and conclusions of the trial examiner.3"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, 37 stating that "concerted activity involving racial dis-
crimination has a unique status"3 and cannot be treated as limited by
section 9(a) in the same manner as are other section 7 concerted
activities. The principle of the exclusivity of the bargaining representa-
tive must be read as restricted by the national policy against racial
discrimination in employment incorporated in Title VII. 39 On certiorari,
a majority of the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Marshall.40
rights association. Both Hawkins and Hollins were members at the time of their
discharge. 420 U.S. at 57.
33. 29U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
34. 192 N.L.R.B. at 179 (trial examiner's decision).
35. In keeping with the traditional view that section 9(a) acts as a limitation on
section 7 rights, the trial examiner stated:
[TMo extend the protection of the Act to the two employees named
would seriously undermine the right of employees to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, handicap and prejudice the em-
ployees' duly designated representative in its efforts to bring about a durable
improvement in working conditions among employees belonging to racial mi-
norities, and place on the Employer an unreasonable burden of attempting to
placate self-designated representatives of minority groups while abiding by the
terms of a valid bargaining agreement and attempting in good faith to meet
whatever demands the bargaining representative put (sic) forth under that
agreement.
Id. at 186.
36. The Emporium and Western Addition Community Organization, 192 N.LR.B.
173 (1971) (mem.). Members Jenkins and Brown filed dissenting opinions. The
former based his conclusion on the belief that the conduct was protected by section 7 as
a concerted activity in spite of the limitations of section 9(a), while the latter found that
the employees were not seeking to collectively bargain with the Employer, but rather to
discuss the situation with the Company.
37. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 927.
39. The appellate court held: "[T]he Labor Board should inquire, in cases such
as this, whether the union was actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest
extent possible by the most expedient and efficacious means. Where the union's efforts
fall short of this high standard, the minority group's concerted activity cannot lose its
section 7 protection." Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wyzanski objected to the use of this test on the
grounds that minority concerted activities in opposition to racial discrimination should be
protected in all circumstances, regardless of the conduct of the union. Id. at 932.
40. 420 U.S. 50. The Supreme Court accepted the conclusion of both the trial
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In reaching its holding that plaintiffs' picketing was not protected
by the NLRA, the Court reaffirmed the traditional interpretations of
three central areas of the Act. First, the Court asserted that the rights
of employees as delineated in section 7 are to be viewed as collective, not
individual, rights which will be protected only to the extent that employ-
ees act in furtherance of the NLRA policy of fostering collective bar-
gaining.41  Second, the Court upheld section 9(a)'s principle of exclu-
sive representation as a limitation on section 7, even in cases of racial
discrimination, thus rejecting the view of the appellate court.42 Finally,
the Court reemphasized the importance of the grievance-arbitration
procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement, especially
when, as in Emporium Capwell, the contract contains a no-discrimina-
tion clause.4" Arbitration is to be preferred to separate bargaining or
economic pressure, in keeping with the strong federal policy in favor
of arbitration of labor disputes.44
The Court also addressed itself to the question of the proper weight
to be afforded the policies of Title VII in the context of an NLRA
proceeding. The decision makes it clear that the NLRB is not the
proper forum for the pursuit of relief for Title VII violations and that
these violations will not be treated as per se unfair labor practices
under the Act.45  However, as has been required by prior Supreme
Court decisions, 46 a government agency, such as the NLRB, cannot
ignore other congressional policies in administering an act entrusted to
examiner and the Board that the employees were seeking to bargain collectively with the
Employer, rather than just to present grievances or discuss the situation. The Court
confined its consideration of the case to this issue. Id. at 60-61.
Mr. Justice Douglas filed the lone dissent and would have affirmed the appellate
court decision based on the belief that minority concerted activities are protected by
section 7 and that to find otherwise is to make all employees prisoners of their union. Id.
at 73.
41. Id. at 61-62.
42. Id. at 65-66.
43. Id. at 66-67.
44. The federal policy favoring the arbitration process is specifically recognized by
the NLRA in section 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970), and has been judicially
developed in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW., 414 U.S. 368
(1974); Boys Market, Inc. v. Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
45. 420 U.S. at 70-72. The contrary result has been argued for by a number of
parties, including respondents in this case, because of what is seen as the inadequacy of
the Title VII remedies and the ineffectiveness of the EEOC in processing complaints.
46. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942); cf. McLean Trucking
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944).
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it. As the Court conceded,47 the rights created by the Act might have
to be broadened to accommodate the policies of Title VII, under the
proper circumstances. Nevertheless, although such outside policies
should be considered, the Court implied that they should not be given
preeminence over policies inherent in the Act without a more express
congressional mandate.
Specifically, the Court announced that the primary policy of the
NLRA will continue to be the encouragement and protection of the
system of collective bargaining. The standards and requirements of
Title VII will not be read into the Act. As the Court stated:
This argument [by employee-plaintiffs] confuses employees' sub-
stantive rights to be free of racial discrimination with the procedures
available under the NLRA for securing these rights. Whether
they are thought to depend upon Title VII or have an independent
source in the NLRA, they cannot be pursued at the expense of
the orderly collective bargaining process contemplated by the
NLRA.48
The Court thus refused to follow the recommendations of certain com-
mentators that the role of the Board and of the Act be expanded in the
area of racial discrimination.49 The contentions that concerted activities
aimed at the elimination of racial discrimination should receive special
status under the Act and that the NLRA should thus provide yet
another remedy for aggrieved racial minorities were rejected. Policies
of racial non-discrimination were treated as secondary to the NLRA's
preeminent policy of insuring industrial tranquility through a system of
collective bargaining.
Although not expressed by the Court, the subordination of the
policy of antidiscrimination in employment to that of fostering collective
bargaining can be explained in the following manner. The elimination
of racial discrimination has always been a valid concern. of the NLRA,
as safeguards have been provided against its occurrence.50 However,
47. 420 U.S. at 73 n.26.
48. Id. at 69.
49. Gould, Racial Protest and Self Help Under Taft-Hartley: The Western Addi-
tion Case, 29 Aim. J. (n.s.) 161 (1974); Comment, Labor Law Meets Title VII:
Remedies for Discrimination in Employment, 6 CONN. L. Rlv. 66 (1974); Comment,
The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act: A New
Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 158 (1974).
50. These safeguards include, among others, the duty of fair representation imposed
upon the bargaining agent. See note 14 supra. Also, the Board has held that racial
discrimination on the part of the union is an unfair labor practice. Hughes Tool Co.,
147 N.LR.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
1976] 727
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this concern springs not out of an express policy within the Act, but
from the realization that the existence of racial discrimination in em-
ployment invites industrial strife. Employees are thus protected from
discriminatory practices by the Act not as an end in itself, but as a
means to the end of industrial peace. This conclusion is supported by
recent statements made by the Board's former General Counsel" and
the Board decision in the case of Jubilee Mfg. Co.
52
There appear to be only two flaws in this otherwise well-reasoned
opinion by the Court. The first of these involves the Court's reaffirma-
tion of the arbitration process in the context of charges of employer
racial discrimination."3 This language would seem to run counter to the
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co." which held that
weaknesses present in the arbitration system render it inferior to the
federal courts as a proper forum for determination of Title VU viola-
tions. However, this inconsistency may be resolved by reading the
Court's approval of arbitration in Emporium to be limited solely to its
appropriateness as a procedure for determining whether racial discrimi-
nation has in fact occurred, when the collective bargaining agreement
contains a no-discrimination clause.
5
The second problem presented by the Court's decision occurs in
part MI of the opinion. Having established that the concerted activities
of the employees were not protected by section 7 and, therefore, that
discharge by the Employer was proper, the Court stated that this "does
not mean that the discharge is immune from attack on other statutory
grounds in the appropriate case." 5  The Court implied that, in a
51. Nash, Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: Some
Preliminary Observations, 25 L.AB. L.J. 259, 264-65 (1974).
52. 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), wherein the Board stated:
[I]n our view, discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin, standing alone . . . is not "inherently destructive" of employees' Section
7 rights and therefore is not violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
There must be actual evidence . . . of a nexus between the alleged discrimina-
tory conduct and the interference with, or restraint of, employees in the exer-
cise of those rights protected by the Act.
Such discrimination can be violative of Section 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) in cer-
tain contexts. . . . However, in each of these areas in which we have decided
issues involving discrimination there has been the necessary direct relationship
between the alleged discrimination and our traditional and primary functions
of fostering collective bargaining ....
Id. at 272-73.
53. 420 U.S. at 66-67.
54. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Court held that an adverse arbitration decision wil
not foreclose to the employee-complainant the right to file charges with the EEOC.
55. The Court stated: "The grievance procedure is directed precisely at determining
whether discrimination has occurred." 420 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 72.
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separate action filed before the EEOC challenging the validity of the
discharge under section 704(a), the Employer's conduct might be
found to violate Title VII. Thus, under the remedial provisions of Title
VII, Hawkins and Hollins could conceivably be reinstated in their jobs
and awarded back pay.517 The end result of the Emporium Capwell
litigation would then be merely that plaintiffs sought a proper remedy
through an improper forum. This incongruous result seems to stem
from the Court's overly zealous desire to segregate the spheres of influ-
ence of Titie VII and of the NLRA. Although the Court's language was
purely dictum, this possibility of an inconsistent result under Title VII
should have been foreclosed.
Another significant aspect of the Emporium opinion is presented in
footnote 12,18 wherein the Court for the first time dealt with the
question of the proper interpretation of the proviso of section 9(a).59
Although this treatment is dicta, the Court took the opportunity to
endorse the interpretation of the proviso advanced by the Second Cir-
cuit in Black Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists.60 Black
Clawson held that the individual employee's "right" under the proviso
to approach the employer to present grievances was not an "absolute"
right, but rather conferred upon the employee only the privilege of pre-
senting such grievances. The employer is not placed under a duty to
entertain these complaints. 6' With regard to the purpose of the statu-
tory language, the Second Circuit stated:
The proviso was apparently designed to safeguard from charges
of violation of the act [section 8(a) (5)62] the employer who vol-
untarily processed employee grievances at the behest of the individ-
57. Id.
58. Id. at 61 n.12.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), wherein the proviso states:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have
such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such ad-
justment.
For a history of the section 9(a) proviso prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to its language and a discussion of those amendments, see Sherman, The
Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. PrTr. L. REv. 35 (1949).
60. 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, Broniman v. A.&P. Tea Co., 353 F.2d
559 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 907 (1966).
61. 313 F.2d at 185.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), which states: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer-to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) [NLRA 9(a)] of this title."
1976]
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ual employee, and to reduce what many had deemed the unlimited
power of the union -to control the processing of grievances.
0 3
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the so-called "employer defense"
reading of the section 9(a) proviso. By so doing, the Court further
indicated that the NLRA does not permit employees to utilize economic
pressure in order to influence the employer's decision whether to exer-
cise his proviso option. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's
disposition of Emporium.64
The Emporium decision raises a significant question: Would the
result have been the same had the union been unwilling and unready to
properly process the employees' grievances? Although a resort to self-
help by minority employees would appear to be more easily justified in
this situation, there are several factors that militate towards an extension
of the application of the picketing prohibition of Emporium to these
facts as well. First and foremost, employees have access to a sufficient
number of alternative remedies to preclude the need for the additional
one sought by respondents. The most obvious remedy is a suit against
the union for breach of its duty to ensure fair representation of all
employees. 65 Employees can also utilize the statutory cause of action
for employment discrimination provided by Title VII. Finally, the
District of Columbia Circuit has held that racial discrimination by an
employer sufficiently interferes with an employee's section 7 rights to
constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA.6 Although these remedies may arguably lack the speed and
effectiveness of picketing, they should be preferred because they are less
disruptive of the labor-management relationship than picketing, provide
for an orderly determination of whether racial discrimination does in
fact exist before action is taken and are already in existence and would
not require any strained re-interpretation or restructuring of the provi-
63. 313 F.2d at 185.
64. A resort to self-help either for the purpose of forcing an employer to bargain
collectively with a minority of employees or to pressure an employer to hear individual
grievances under the section 9(a) proviso is proscribed by the opinion in Emporium.
Therefore, the proviso has been rendered a hollow promise, since it cannot be enforced
by a proceeding under the Act or by economic coercion.
65. See note 14 supra. However, a violation of the duty of fair representation
occurs only when the union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967), citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) and
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
66. United Packinghouse Workers Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). However, the Board has specifically refused to
follow this approach in Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
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sions of the Act.6" Second, to allow minority self-help, even when the
union is not aiding the minority, would be inequitable to the employer.
In addition to the examples mentioned by ,the Court,6 the prejudice to
the employer is demonstrated by the fact that during the course of
collective bargaining, an employer will make concessions in order to
avoid the disruption of his business occasioned by employee picketing.
To allow minority employees -to picket him because of derelictions on
the part of the union is to injure him doubly. Therefore, industrial
peace will be preserved without undue interference with the rights of the
minority employees by prohibiting minority economic pressure in ac-
cordance with the decision in Emporium.
The decision in Emporium should not be read to indicate a weak-
ening of the Supreme Court's commitment to the eradication of racial
discrimination in employment. Rather, it evidences a balancing of
policy considerations, resulting in the emphasis of the smooth operation
of the federal system of labor relations at what the Court views as a
nominal inconvenience to the civil rights movement. If employee pro-
tection beyond that offered by the present provisions of Title VII is
needed, Congressional legislation is the proper solution. The Supreme
Court should not, and apparently has declined to, judicially redirect the
NLRA to achieve this result.
STEVEN WILLIAM SUFLAS
Securities Regulation-United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman: The Supreme Court Refines the Howey Formula
For the sixth time1 since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933,
the United States Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman2 has gone in search of a workable definition of "security." The
67. For a discussion of these and other alternative remedies see Note, Racial
Discrimination in Employment and the Remedy of Self-Help: An Unwarranted
Addition, 15 WM. &MARY L. REV. 615 (1974).
68. 420 U.S. at 67-69.
1. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959);
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967).
2. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
1976]
